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Are more and better indicators the solution? 
Comment to William Starbuck 
 
by 
Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey, University of Zurich 
 
Summary: We discuss Starbuck’s proposal to improve decision processes in 
scholarly evaluation. While we agree that more variety is needed in evaluation 
committees, we suggest to enlist scholars from other research fields rather than people 
from outside academia. We disagree with the proposal that reliable indicators of 
research effectiveness will improve research. We argue that evaluating research with 
even better and more reliable indicators would lead to worse results than what is 
observed today. Attention would be deviated from the content of research, and 
intrinsic motivation, which is essential for good research, would be crowded out. We 
propose that evaluations that are based on indicators need to be pushed back. After a 
careful selection process, researchers need to be given the opportunity to pursue the 
research they consider to be fruitful.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
It is a pleasure for us to comment on William Starbuck’s (2009) paper. It is a most 
competent, well-informed and relevant contribution and moreover – which is a rather 
rare occasion – fun to read. We strongly agree with his critique of how behavioural 
and social science is undertaken today. In particular, we think that his strictures 
against the “mass production of knowledge” and the “over-reliance on and misuse of 
statistical methods” is well taken. We address our comments to two suggestions in 
William Starbuck’s concluding section “What to do?”.   
 
First, William Starbuck proposes that researchers should “enlist people other than 
academics” in the evaluation of research to make researchers aware of the biases that 
infuse their work. We agree that different perspectives help to conduct more relevant 
research. There is indeed considerable evidence that a variety in opinions helps to 
avoid what has been called groupthink (Janis 1982), i.e. the inability of evaluation 
committees that are composed of insiders to consider broader issues. To get a more 
open and relevant view of what research has produced, persons from outside the 
narrow research field are required. However, it has long been established in the 
economics and sociology of science that an efficient governance of academia is 
characterized by a “republic of science” (Polanyi 1967), which is self-organized by its 
peers, offers substantial discretion to scholars in choosing what they see as the most 
challenging scientific problems, and has a special reward structure called “taste for 
science” (Merton 1973, Dasgupta and David 1994). This reward structure is 
characterized by recognition by the peers and autonomy rather than by marketable 
outcomes. It is questionable whether people from outside academia share this “taste 
for science”. Of course, there are many examples in the history of science that peers 
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have misjudged path-breaking research for a long time or have overestimated the 
value of research ideas. To mitigate such errors while enabling the necessary “view 
from outside” by people who share the “taste for science”, we propose to enlist people 
from inside academia, though from a different field of research.  
 
Second, William Starbuck (2009) suggests that “The only way to overcome unreliable 
indicators of research effectiveness is to develop and disseminate reliable indicators”. 
If this sentence is taken in a strict sense, it is difficult to object: reliable indicators are 
better than unreliable indicators. But if this opening statement of “What to do?” is 
taken more broadly – and we believe that this is Starbuck’s intention – we disagree 
with respect to the evaluation of scholarly work. Even if indicators for research 
quality were perfect – which is not the case, since reviewers’ biases, low inter-rate 
reliability and low prognostic quality are ubiquitous (Starbuck 2005), and 
bibliometrics are “breathtakingly naïve” (Adler et al 2008:14) – evaluating research 
leads to even worse results than what is observed today. There are two main reasons: 
 
The first reason is that a more intensive use of research indicators deviates attention 
even more from the content of research. What researchers are told is that it is essential 
to do well on the indicators – and that it does not really matter how and why. High 
scores in the measurement based on questionable data become the goal rather than a 
means of measuring quality. As a consequence, strategic reactions in the form of 
multiple tasking and counter-strategies of scholars and institutions are to be expected. 
Even if qualitative and quantitative measures worked perfectly, this problem could not 
be avoided.  
The multiple tasking problem has been studied in economics extensively (Holmstrom 
& Milgrom 1991): People maximize indicators that are easy to measure and disregard 
features that are hard to measure. An example is the “slicing strategy” when scholars 
divide their research results into a “least publishable unit” spreading them into as 
many papers as possible. This has been demonstrated in a study for Australia (Butler 
2003). The mid-1990s saw a linkage of the number of peer-reviewed publications to 
the funding of universities and individual scholars. The number of publications 
increased dramatically but the quality (measured by citations) decreased.  
Counter-strategies go further than multiple tasking and are more difficult to observe. 
They consist in altering research behaviour itself in order to “beat the system”: 
Examples are:  
- Scholars are induced to distort their results to please, or at least not to oppose, 
prospective referees. Frey (2003) calls this behaviour “academic prostitution”. 
- Reviewers are prone to judge papers more favourably that cite their own work 
approvingly and tend to reject papers threatening their previous work. Some editors 
pressure authors to cite their journals in order to raise their impact ranking 
(Monastersky 2005).  
- Creative and unorthodox research is discouraged and pedestrian research is 
encouraged. A referee process based on the opinions of average peers favours average 
research (Gillies 2008). As a consequence, scholars are induced to produce predictable 
but unexciting results that will be accepted more easily by referees rather than path-
breaking contributions. 
- Homogenization of research endeavours takes place. For economics, Great Britain 
provides an example. The share of heterodox, not strictly neoclassical economics, has 
sunk drastically since the ranking of departments, based in part on their publication 
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and citations, was established. The reason is that small and specialized journals are 
less attractive for researchers due to their small impact factor (Lee 2007).  
 
The second reason why better indicators may lead to even worse research results is 
that the reliance on indicators leads to a systematic crowding out of the intrinsic 
motivation to do research. There is an extensive literature showing that intrinsic 
(rather than extrinsic) incentives are crucial for good research. This also corresponds 
to casual observations: it is difficult to think of a leading scientist who was not 
mainly, and sometimes entirely, motivated by his or her curiosity. Just consider the 
greatest natural scientists of the world, such as Newton or Einstein, or the greatest 
social scientists, such as Schumpeter or Keynes. The problem is that the intrinsic 
interest in doing research is crowded out when academics are evaluated based on an 
extrinsic measure of evaluation, i.e. the indicators (Frey 1997, Bénabou and Tirole 
2003). 
 
For these two reasons, improving the quality of research indicators does not provide a 
useful solution to the basic problems of today’s research. A more fundamental 
approach has to be considered (see more fully Osterloh and Frey 2009): Evaluations 
by research indicators have to be pushed back, and researchers have to be given the 
opportunity to pursue the content and type of research they consider to be fruitful. 
Once young scientists have shown during a carefully conducted socialization and 
selection process that they are well qualified, creative and intrinsically motivated to 
do research, they should be given the opportunity to do the research they choose to 
undertake. Such kind of input control is not unusual in other professional fields that 
are characterized by the inappropriateness of objective output measures, like in legal 
institutions and governance agencies (e.g. Posner, forthcoming). Though peer review 
has many shortcomings, it will still be necessary to screen the candidates for 
appointment and to decide on grant applications. To improve the decision processes, 
scholars from a different field of research should be enlisted in the evaluation 
committees. 
 
It is clear that such a resource allocation may allow some academics to slow down 
their efforts. However – and this is what should count in academia – the rest of them 
produce useful and even path-breaking research, and they succumb less to 
faddishness.  
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